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"A STROKE OF GENIUS"
IN KONG YUNMING
O1
Albert HY Chen*
When Kong Yunming was decided by the lower courts, it neither occurred to the
Court of First Instance nor the Court of Appeal that Art 36 of the Basic Law
could be argued to imply that the "right to social welfare" conferred therein on
Hong Kong residents can be "concretised" to mean the social welfare benefits
that Hong Kong residents enjoyed immediately before the 1997 handover in
accordance with the laws or policies prevailing at that time. The "stroke of
genius" in the Court of Final Appeal's decision was to define precisely the
substantive content and scope of the social welfare right protected by Art 36, at
least as far as social security in the form of cash assistance for the needy such as
the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance scheme was concerned. This was
achieved by reading Art 36 and Art 145 of the Basic Law as a whole, so as to
import from Art 145 into Art 36 the level of social welfare provisions as they
existed immediately before the 1997 handover. This comment will focus on this
adoption of the level or content of social welfare rights as of 1997 as the baseline
for the protection of social welfare rights under the Basic Law, and assess it by
comparing it with the approach adopted by the lower courts in this case, and with
overseas jurisprudence on the constitutional protection of socio-economic rights.
Introduction
Section E.3 of Ribeiro PJ's judgment in Kong Yunming v Director of Social
Welfare' is entitled "The content of the Article 36 right". This is, in my
opinion, the single most crucial section in the Court of Final Appeal
(CFA)'s decision in this case, as well as a landmark development in the
jurisprudence of the social and economic, as distinguished from civil and
political, rights enshrined in the Basic Law. The main point in this section
of the judgment does not appear to have been considered and addressed
in the judgments of the lower courts in this case, nor does it appear to
have been argued in exactly the same manner as it is now formulated in
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1 [2014] 1 HKC 518 (CFA).
this section of the judgment. I would describe this point as a stroke of
genius in the judgment:
"Read together with Article 145, [Article 36] provides the framework for
identifying a constitutionally protected right to social welfare: .... Article 145 ...
endorses the rules and policies established under the previous system and ...
it implicitly regards them as rules established 'in accordance with law' and
thus capable of constituting particular rights protected by Article 36. ...
The relevant right given constitutional protection by Article 36 in the present case
is the right defined by the eligibility rules for CSSA [Comprehensive Social
Security Assistance] derived from the previous system of social welfare and
in existence as at 1 July 1997. Crucially, this means that Article 36 confers
constitutional protection on the rules which laid down a one-year, and
not a seven-year, residence requirement as a condition of eligibility for
CSSA".2
It was further held that any post-1997 modification of the one-year rule
would be subject to constitutional review and proportionality analysis.3
This comment will focus on this adoption of the level or content of
social welfare rights as of 1997 as the baseline for the protection of social
welfare rights under the Basic Law, and assess it by comparing it with the
approach adopted by the lower courts in Kong Yunming and with overseas
jurisprudence on the constitutional protection of socio-economic rights.
The Lower Courts
In the lower courts as well as in the CFA, Kong's counsel put forward
two main sets of arguments, one based on the right to social welfare
(Art 36 of the Basic Law (BL36)) and the "development and improvement"
of "the previous social welfare system" (BL145), and the other based on
the right to equality and non-discrimination (BL25 and BL39). Both
the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the Court of Appeal (CA) did
not consider the first set of arguments to be strong, and devoted more
attention and space in their judgments to the question of discrimination,
by considering whether the case concerns discrimination on a "suspect
ground" or not, and, if not, the appropriate degree of deference to the
government or intensity of judicial review of the government's policy to
be adopted in scrutinising the seven-year residence rule for qualifying for
CSSA. Let us examine how these lower courts dealt with the first set of
arguments.
2 Ibid., [33]-[35] (emphasis supplied).
Ibid., [36].
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In the CFI,4 Andrew Cheung J held that "the right given under
Art 36 to social welfare is not an absolute right but one that may be
restricted".' He found "the test for scrutinising any purported change or
restriction" "in Art 145 itself'. 6 BL145 provides that the government
shall, "[o]n the basis of the previous social welfare system", "formulate
policies on the development and improvement of this system in the light
of the economic conditions and social needs". Cheung J considered that
"[w]hat constitutes development and improvement ... is best judged by
the Government, subject to the scrutiny of the Legislative Council".'
However, "a newly-formulated policy under Art 145 of the Basic Law, even
if it should otherwise satisfy the internal requirements for the content of
the policy, may still be challenged for infringing other constitutionally-
guaranteed rights"' such as the right to equality and non-discrimination.
Furthermore, a policy which is discriminatory and unjustified "can hardly
be regarded as a policy on the 'development and improvement' of the
pre-existing system".' The learned judge thus concluded that "the present
case boils down to the question of discrimination".0
On appeal, the CA agreed that "the case boiled down to the question
of discrimination"." Stock VP summarised Mdm Kong's case as raising
the following four questions: (1) breach of BL36; (2) breach of BL25;
(3) breach of Art 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (on equality and
non-discrimination); and (4) breach of BL145 (on the ground that the
introduction of the seven-year rule was a "retrogressive measure")." Here
Kong's arguments on the basis of BL36 and BL145 respectively seem to
have been treated as separate arguments. Ironically, whereas the CFA
ultimately ruled in Kong's favour by reading BL36 and BL145 together,
before the CA it was the Government (Director of Social Welfare) which
argued "that Article 36 must be read in the light of Article 145, whereby
it is clear that a purposive construction of the two articles read together
illustrates the discretion given to the Government as to what services
are provided, the level of support in relation to each selected service and
the flexibility of the system's development dictated by ever-changing
economic and social circumstances".13 According to the Government's
[2009] 4 HKLRD 382 (CFI).
5 Ibid., [51].
6 Ibid., [52].
Ibid., [56].
8 Ibid., [58].
9 Ibid., [63].
o Ibid., [64].
11 [2012] 4 HKC 180 (CA), [85].
12 Ibid., [13].
13 Ibid., [23].
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argument, "[w]hat [BL36] means is that Hong Kong residents shall have
such social welfare as may be accorded pursuant to the formulation of
policies envisaged by Article 145; that that right or entitlement carries
within itself eligibility criteria".14
This argument was basically accepted by the CA, which also pointed
out the problems or weakness in Kong's arguments in this regard. As
regards Kong's BL36 argument, the CA opined that it "presupposes that
Article 36 confers a prima facie right in all residents to all forms of social
welfare and even then regardless of eligibility criteria or level of benefit"." This
in turn raises the question of "[w]hat does social welfare encompass?" 16
The CA found the argument unsustainable that "Article 36 envisages,
indeed requires, that social welfare is to be accorded to all residents, save
to the extent specifically limited or denied them by law, so that, unless
specifically excluded, its provision in all its forms is obligatory regardless
of oversight and regardless of competing demands"." The CA also found
unconvincing the argument that the introduction of the seven-year rule
was a "retrogressive step"" in breach of BL145. It asked "rhetorically,
what if an 'improvement' today in one benefit necessarily results in the
diminution of another?"" There was no reason why the qualifying criteria
for social welfare could not be adjusted from time to time "in order to
maintain a viable system for future generations"."
At this point, it may be observed that it neither occurred to the CFI
nor the CA that BL36 could be argued to imply that the "right to social
welfare" conferred therein on Hong Kong residents can be "concretised"
to mean the social welfare benefits that Hong Kong residents enjoyed
immediately before the 1997 handover in accordance with the laws or
policies prevailing at that time. Before these two courts, Kong's argument
that the introduction of the seven-year rule was a retrogressive measure
was apparently made in the context of BL145 rather than BL36. However,
since BL145 refers to "policies" to be formulated "in the light of the
economic conditions and social needs", the "retrogressive measure" that
Kong complained about did not appear to be as serious a matter (given
that we have to take rights seriously) as a violation of a constitutional
right protected by Chapter III of the Basic Law (on the "fundamental
rights and duties of the residents").
1 Ibid., [51].
1 Ibid., [53] (emphasis supplied).
16 Ibid., [56].
"7 Ibid., [62].
1 Ibid., [66].
19 Ibid., [66].
20 Ibid., [67].
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The Stroke of Genius
The "stroke of genius" in the CFA's decision was thus to define precisely
the substantive content and scope of the social welfare right protected
by BL36, at least as far as social security in the form of cash assistance for
the needy such as the CSSA scheme was concerned. This was achieved
by reading BL36 and BL145 as a whole, so as to import from BL145 into
BL36 the level of social welfare provisions as they existed immediately
before the 1997 handover. The rule ultimately enunciated by the CFA
regarding the constitutional protection of Hong Kong residents' right
to CSSA at its 1997 level (at least insofar as the requirement regarding
length of residence as a qualifying condition was concerned), subject
to constitutional review on the basis of proportionality analysis, could
not have been developed if only BL36 or only BL145 was in existence.
If only BL36 exists, the content and scope of the social welfare right
it refers to would probably be that determined by laws made by the
legislature, or, in the absence of such laws, by policies introduced by
the government with the support of the legislature (which exercises
the power of financial control of public expenditure). If only BL145
exists, it is also doubtful whether it alone can render unconstitutional
the seven-year rule in the present case. This point may be elaborated
as follows.
There are several provisions" in the Basic Law which, like BL145,
refer to relevant systems and practices that existed before the handover
and evince an intention to preserve them largely and at the same time
permit the post-1997 government to introduce new policies and practices.
Some of these provisions have been the subjects of judicial deliberations.
For example, in Cheung Man Wai v Director of Social Welfare," the court
considered the application of BL142 (regarding "the previous systems"
of professional qualifications), BL144 (on subvented organisations' staff
remaining in employment "in accordance with the previous system")
and BL145 (the applicant for judicial review in this case was a social
worker). In Secretary for Justice v Lau Kwok Fai,2 3 the court reviewed
the constitutionality of pay cuts imposed on civil servants in the light
of BLIO (on terms of employment that are "no less favourable than
before") and BL103 (on the maintenance of the "previous system" of
employment and management of civil servants). More recently, in
21 See particularly Section 6 (public servants) of Chapter VI of the Basic Law, and Chapters V and
VI of the Basic Law.
22 (1999) 8 HKPLR 241 (CFI); [2000] 3 HKLRD 255 (CA). The CFI judgment is more relevant
for our present purposes.
23 (2005) 8 HKCFAR 304.
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Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong v Secretary for Justice," the court reviewed
the constitutionality of a new system of "school-based management" of
publicly funded schools with reference to BL136 (which is strikingly
similar to BL145 in that it provides for the formulation of "policies on
the development and improvement of education" "[o]n the basis of the
previous educational system") and BL141 (on freedom of religion and
on religious organisations continuing to run schools "according to their
previous practice"). It is instructive for our present purposes to examine
here how the CFA approached the interpretation of these Basic Law
provisions in Catholic Diocese.
Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong v Secretary for Justice
In the lead judgment jointly delivered by Ma CJ and Ribeiro PJ in this
case, the question was discussed as to how to interpret the phrase "based
on the previous educational system" in BL136(1)." In this regard, the
judgment refers to the CFAs previous decision in Lau Kwok Fai26 on the
interpretation of BL103 (which provides that Hong Kong's "previous
system of recruitment, employment, ... training and management for
the public service ... shall be maintained"), and points out that the
CFA had held in that case that BL103 "was designed to preserve the
continuity of the system as a whole and not to prevent changes to
elements of the system which could be expected to occur under any
system governing public service"." The judgment then quotes Sir
Anthony Mason:"
"As Sir Anthony Mason NPJ put it, a constitutional provision in such
terms would only inhibit a development which was 'such a material change
that it resulted in the abandonment of the previous system"'.29
After referring to the CFAs interpretation of BL103 in Lau Kwok Fai, the
judgment then turns to consider BL136 itself:
"It is important to note that in authorising the HKSAR government to
formulate policies on the 'development and improvement of education, ...
Art 136(1) similarly accepts that changes may be made to elements of the
previously existing system and, in our view, the Lau Kwok Fai approach is
equally applicable. On that approach, the 2004 amendments [introducing the
24 (2011) 14 HKCFAR 754.
25 Ibid., [46].
2 See Lau Kwok Fai (CFA) (n 23 above).
27 Catholic Diocese (n 24 above), [61].
28 Ibid., [61].
29 Lau Kwok Fai (CFA) (n 23 above), [66] (emphasis supplied).
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new system of 'school-based management'] plainly do not involve abandonment
of the pre-1997 educational system and do not fall foul of Art 136(1)".30
It may therefore be seen that in interpreting BL136(1) which is similarly
structured and phrased as BL145 in our present case, the CFA has set a
high threshold for what "policies on the development and improvement"
of the existing system would be considered unconstitutional on the ground
that they cannot be said to be formulated "on the basis of the previous"
system. In order to constitute a violation of the Basic Law provision, the
change introduced by the impugned policy may have to be so significant
as to be tantamount to abandonment of the previous system. This would
suggest that it would be very difficult to argue in the present case before the
CFA that the introduction of the seven-year rule constitutes a violation of
BL145 (assuming that BL36 does not exist), particularly if it is also taken
into account that BL145 expressly refers to "economic conditions and social
needs" in the light of which social welfare policies are to be formulated.
Let us now turn to examine how Ma CJ and Ribeiro PJ in their joint
judgment dealt with BL141 in Catholic Diocese, which, in my opinion,
also throws light on Ribeiro PJ's approach in Kong Yunming. The following
passage is particularly instructive:
"When ... a constitutional challenge is made to a piece of legislation or
to certain executive or administrative conduct, the court must generally
begin by ascertaining what, if any, constitutional rights are engaged. If no
such constitutional rights can be identified, the challenge necessarily fails
in limine. If certain constitutional rights are engaged, the court considers
whether the legislation or conduct complained of amount to interference
with those rights. If they do, the court has to consider whether those rights
are absolute and if not, whether the interference can be justified on a
proportionality analysis. ... The principal defect in the appellant's case is
that it fails to take the first step of identifying the protected constitutional right.
Instead, [counsel for the appellant] concentrates on a textual argument
and, basing himself on the words 'according to their previous practice' in
Art 141(3), asserts that the appellant is entitled to claim constitutional
protection for what constituted its 'practice' in the running of its schools
as a matter of fact prior to 1 July 1997".31
The judgment then proceeded to construe BL141(3) and extract from it
the constitutional right that it guarantees:
"[Airt. 141(3)'s provision that religious organisations 'may, according to
their previous practice, continue to run ... schools ... ', read purposively,
Catholic Diocese (n 24 above), [62] (emphasis supplied).
Ibid., [65]-[66] (emphasis supplied).
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should be taken to mean that religious organisations 'may, according to their
previous practice in so far as it involves the exercise of their right to freedom of
religious belief and religious activity, continue to run ... schools (etc)'. ... It is
the religious dimension of their previous practice that receives protection
as part of the core constitutional right to religious freedom as applicable to
religious organisations".32
The judgment concluded on this point as follows:
"When the constitutional right protected by Art 141(3) is correctly
identified, it becomes apparent that it is not infringed by the 2004
amendments". 33
This approach in Catholic Diocese of paying attention to and giving
priority to the task of identifying and defining the exact content and
scope of the protected constitutional right that may be affected by the
impugned governmental action in the case was fully followed by Ribeiro
PJ in his lead judgment in Kong Yunming. In the two lower courts, a main
reason why Kong's arguments on the basis of BL36 and BL145 failed was
probably that they failed to identify and define precisely the constitutional
right that was violated by the introduction of the seven-year rule.
Ribeiro PJ's "stroke of genius" was to identify and define it as the right of
Hong Kong residents to receive social security benefits in the form
of CSSA in accordance with the rules and policies prevailing at the
time of the 1997 handover.
A Dose of Judicial Activism
The question arises here of whether the CFA was well justified in finding
such a right on the basis of a combined reading of BL36 and BL145. In my
opinion, the CFAs decision on this point is an act of judicial creativity, a
deliberate policy choice, and a dose of judicial activism. Even if BL36 and
BL145 are to be read together, alternative readings, such as those adopted
by the two lower courts, are perfectly plausible, and it is by no means
obvious and clear that the CFAs reading is best and correct. Ribeiro PJ
criticised the approach adopted by Stock VP in the court below as "lay[ing]
the emphasis entirely on Article 145 and depriv[ing] Article 36 of any
meaningful effect".34 It is true that Ribeiro PJ's approach turns BL36 from
2 Ibid., [78] (emphasis in original).
Ibid., [93].
Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [32].
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a provision that is hardly justiciable,"5 and that would otherwise operate
no more than as a "directive principle of social policy"36 which is only
morally and politically binding on the government and the legislature,
into a justiciable provision with a substantive core content (ie giving
constitutional protection - subject to proportionality justifications -
to social welfare rights that prevailed at the time of the 1997 handover).
However, whether the latter corresponds to the intention of the framers
of the Basic Law as evinced in the text of BL36 and BL145 is a different
matter. In my opinion, the language of these provisions is by no means
conclusive in this regard, 7 nor has the CFA cited any travaux preparatoires
or other contextual materials in support of its interpretation.38
In the above-cited passage in Catholic Diocese, it was pointed out
that once the protected constitutional right has been identified and has
been shown to be interfered with, the next question to be considered
Even where constitutional provisions on social and economic rights are not justiciable or fully
enforceable by courts, this does not mean that they are entirely meaningless and insignificant.
See, eg the discussion in Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social
Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2008) 238-241; Katharine G Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012) 13, 132.
6 "Directive principles of social policy" that are non-justiciable are set out in Art 45 of the
Irish Constitution of 1937. The Indian Constitution of 1950 also provides for non-justiciable
"directive principles of state policy". For the legal status of social and economic rights in Ireland,
see, eg, Malcolm Langford (ed), Social Rights ]urisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), Chapter 16; Paul O'Connell, "The Death of Socio-Economic Rights" (2011)
74 MLR 532.
The language of BL36 and BL145 (read together) may be compared and contrasted with BL100,
which provides that "[plublic servants serving in all Hong Kong government departments ...
before the establishment of the [HKSAR] may all remain in employment and retain their
seniority with pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before"
(emphasis supplied). There is however no provision in BL36 or BL145 that after 1997, the social
welfare benefits enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall be no less favourable than before. The CFA
in Kong Yunming effectively decided that this should be so unless the government can provide
sufficient justification for a particular cutback in social welfare benefits.
I have consulted the travaux preparatoires of the Basic Law Drafting Committee published in Li
Haoran (PY&) (ed), The Drafting Process of the Hong Kong Basic Law (WAAA2[LMRf !
RN) (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2012) (in 3 volumes), and found no evidence suggesting
that the intention of BL36 or BL145 was to ensure that the level of social welfare to be provided
after 1997 should be no less favourable than before. See Vol I, pp 307-327, and Vol III, pp 1107-
1111 of this publication. It is interesting to note that in the earlier drafts of the Basic Law, BL36
(or its equivalents in the earlier drafts) only provided that "Hong Kong residents shall have the
right to social welfare", and the phrase "in accordance with law" only appeared for the first time
in the "9th draft" of February 1989. Some commentators pointed out during the drafting process
that there was no existing law (ie legislation enacted by the legislature, as distinguished from
government policies) in Hong Kong governing the right to social welfare. It is also noteworthy
that in the earlier drafts, BL145 (or its equivalents) provided that "The HKSAR Government
shall maintain the previous social welfare system, and shall, on its own, formulate policies on
the development and improvement of this system in the light of the economic conditions and
social needs". In the "6th draft" of February 1989, this was changed to "On the basis of the
previous social welfare system, the Government of the HKSAR shall, on its own, formulate
policies., which is the present version of BL145. Some commentators suggested at the time
that the reference to "economic conditions" should be deleted, because this might suggest that
social welfare services may be cut if the economic conditions were unfavourable.
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is whether the right is absolute or can be limited in accordance with
proportionality analysis. After Ribeiro PJ in Kong Yunming identified
the protected constitutional right to social welfare in this case, 39 he
went on to decide that this right is not absolute but may be limited,
provided the limitations can sustain a proportionality analysis.40
He further held that as this right is not a "fundamental right"1
and involves socio-economic policies and allocation of financial
resources,42 the court in exercising its power of constitutional review
and proportionality scrutiny would accord to the government a "wide
margin of discretion",43 and would only strike down the governmental
act if it is "manifestly without reasonable foundation",44 "manifestly
unreasonable"45 or "wholly irrational". 46 The application of this test
ultimately resulted in the impugned seven-year rule being struck
down.4 ' The question arises here as to what is the difference between
the CFAs application of the proportionality test to the limitations on
the right to social welfare in this case and the lower courts' application
of the justification test to the issue of discrimination in the same case.
It is noteworthy that the CFA decided this case only on the basis of a
violation of the right to social welfare, and did not express any opinion
on whether there was also an unconstitutional violation of the right to
equality and non-discrimination.
Comparing the Two Approaches
In my opinion, in the circumstances of the present case it would be
easier for the government to argue that there is no unconstitutional
discrimination than to argue that there is no unconstitutional violation
of the right to social welfare that was identified in Ribeiro PJ's judgment.
On the question of discrimination, it is by now well established in
Hong Kong law48 that a distinction has to be drawn between two
categories of differential treatment - that based on "inherently suspect
grounds"49 such as race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, religious or
' Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [33]-[35].
o Ibid., [36], [39].
1 Ibid., [42].
42 Ibid., [41].
Ibid., [42], [138].
Ibid., [40], [43], [143].
Ibid., [106].
6 Ibid., [62]; see also [73].
Ibid., [143]-[1441.
4 See particularly the CFAs decision in Fok Chun Wah v Hospital Authority (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409.
4 Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [40].
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political beliefs and social origins,o and that based on other factors
(such as length of residence in the territory or the amount of property
possessed) which may be justified as a matter of socio-economic policy, the
public interest and allocation of scarce resources. In the latter situation,
particularly where the situation involves differential treatment in the
domain of "rights associated with purely social and economic policies"51
(in contradistinction to rights associated with "fundamental concepts ...
which go to the heart of any society" such as "the right to life, the right
not to be tortured, ... the freedom of expression and opinion, freedom
of religion, ... the right to a fair trial", etc.) 2 , the application of the
justification test (for differential treatment) would be less stringent, or
the degree of judicial scrutiny of the impugned governmental measure
would be less intense. In these circumstances, the differential treatment
would not constitute unconstitutional discrimination if it is intended
to achieve a legitimate aim, is rationally connected to that aim and
is not "manifestly without reasonable foundation" or "self-evidently
unreasonable".
It may first be noted that the structures of, and thresholds involved
in, the proportionality or justification tests for limitations on the right
to social welfare, particularly CSSA (hereafter called "Situation A")
and for differential treatment of residents' right to CSSA on the basis
of residential requirements (hereafter called "Situation B") are basically
the same: They both involve consideration of legitimate objectives,
rational connections and whether the governmental act is manifestly
unreasonable. The difference in the application of proportionality analysis
to the two situations lies in what exactly is the governmental act that is
impugned and that has to be justified. 4
In Situation A, since the right that is subject to limitations is the right
to CSSA in accordance with the rules and policies that were in force in
1997, the impugned act that has to be justified is the relevant change
in the rules, ie the substitution of the new seven-year residence rule for
Fok Chun Wah (CFA) (n 48 above), [77]. As explained in this CFA judgment, in these cases
"the reason for unequal treatment strikes at the heart of core-values relating to personal or
human characteristics"; "[tihese characteristics involve the respect and dignity that society
accords to a human being. They are fundamental societal values" [77]. "Where core values
relating to personal characteristics are involved, the court will naturally subject the relevant
legislation or decision to a particularly severe scrutiny" [78].
Fok Chun Wah (CFA) (n 48 above), [79].
52 Ibid., [79].
5 Kong Yunming (CA) (n I1 above), [99], [111], [190], [194]-[196].
51 Apart from the difference discussed here, there is apparently also a difference between the
degrees of rigour of the application of the proportionality test in this case by the two lower
courts on the one hand and the CFA on the other hand, with the CFA applying the test more
rigorously.
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the old one-year rule. In Situation B, what needs to be justified is the
differential treatment of residents, ie treating them differently (in terms
of their entitlement to CSSA) depending on whether they have resided
in Hong Kong for seven years or not.
In Situation B, the justification may be logically divided into two
stages. First, the government would argue that it is justified (given the
need to ensure the financial sustainability of Hong Kong's social welfare
system in the long term) to give differential treatment (in CSSA) by
taking into account the length of the person's residence in Hong Kong, ie
it is permissible to draw a line between those who are entitled to CSSA
and those who are not eligible for it by reference to length of residence.
Second, the government would argue that it is not manifestly unreasonable
to draw the line at seven years, rather than, say, nine years, five years,
three years, or one year, etc. As is demonstrated by the judgments of the
CFI and CA in Kong Yunming," it is not difficult for the government to
succeed in the first stage, given that resources are scarce and it is not
unreasonable to give priority to residents who have more affinity with
Hong Kong by reason of their having resided here longer. Once the first
stage is passed and it is accepted that the government may legitimately
draw a line on the basis of length of residence, it would be difficult for
the applicant for judicial review to challenge the act of drawing the line
at the point of seven years (rather than another period of time), as the
question involves socio-economic policies and the public interest and it
may be best for the government rather than the court to determine where
exactly the line should be drawn. This is largely why the government won
in this second stage too before the two lower courts.56
However, the same or a similar justification or proportionality test
would operate differently when applied to Situation A. In this situation,
what needs to be justified is not the differential treatment of residents
on the basis of their length of residence, but the change of policy so as
to deny access to CSSA to residents who have resided in Hong Kong for
more than one year but less than seven years (even though the policy
change of 2003 did not have retroactive effect and was only applicable
to those who came to reside in Hong Kong after 1 January 2004)."
Kong Yunming (CFI) (n 4 above), [116]; Kong Yunming (CA) (n 11 above), [109].
Kong Yunming (CFI) (n 4 above), [127]-[130]; Kong Yunming (CA) (n 11 above), [111], [113].
The non-retroactivity of the new seven-year rule was a factor which the two lower courts
apparently took into account: Kong Yunming (CFI) (n 4 above), [30], [106]; Kong Yunming (CA)
(n 11 above), [1]. In assessing the constitutionality of the policy change, the CFA apparently
considered the non-retroactivity of the policy change to be immaterial. However, it is at least
arguable that BL36 only accords constitutional protection to social welfare rights that existed
in Hong Kong (in accordance with relevant policies or laws) in 1997 (in the case of persons
who were already Hong Kong residents in 1997) or at the time a person became a Hong Kong
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Thus unlike in Situation B, the judicial reasoning process in Situation
A would start from the constitutionally protected right (which is not
absolute but subject to proportionate restrictions) to qualify for CSSA
after one year's residence, and any rule involving a lengthening of the
residence requirement would need to be justified. This initial preference
for, or presumption in favour of, the one-year residence rule does not
exist in Situation B. In the latter situation, one starts by considering the
rationality of having a residence requirement (of whatever length), and
then proceeds to consider whether the length of residence now required
by the government (in this case a seven-year period which coincided with
the length of residence required for qualifying as a permanent resident)
is manifestly unreasonable. In Situation A, the one-year rule is not only
presumed to be reasonable but is given constitutional status - albeit only
a presumptive, and not absolute, constitutional status. That is why it is
easier for the government to justify the seven-year rule in Situation B
than in Situation A.
Comparing with Overseas Jurisprudence
It remains for me to consider the CFAs decision in Kong in the
light of overseas jurisprudence on the constitutional protection of
social and economic rights. Generally speaking, provisions on socio-
economic rights in constitutions may or may not be justiciable and
enforceable by courts of law. For example, the "directive principles of
state policy" in the Indian Constitution of 1950 were expressly made
non-justiciable," though the Indian Supreme Court has now rendered
socio-economic rights judicially enforceable by incorporating them
into the jurisprudence of the enforceable constitutional provision on
the fundamental right to life." The post-apartheid Constitution of
South Africa enacted in 1996 as interpreted by its Constitutional Court
resident (in the case of persons who became Hong Kong residents after 1997). According to this
argument, since Kong arrived in Hong Kong and became a Hong Kong resident only in 2005 (at
a time when the relevant policy stipulated a seven-year residence rule for entitlement to CSSA
in respect of persons who became Hong Kong residents after 2003), she should not be able to
argue that her entitlement to CSSA should be determined in accordance with the policy that
existed in 1997.
See Art 37 thereof.
9 Art 21 of the Indian constitution. See, eg, Langford (ed) (n 36 above), Chapter 5; Dennis
M Davis, "Socio-economic rights: Has the promise of eradicating the divide between first
and second generation rights been fulfilled?" in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds),
Comparative Constitutional Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) 519, 525-527; Rehan
Abeyratne, "Socioeconomic rights and constitutional legitimacy in India", Int'l Const L Blog
(11 April 2013), available at http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/04/socioeconomic-rights-and-
constitutional- legitimacy- in- india (visited 9 Feb 2014).
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provides a well-known model of justiciable socio-economic rights in
the contemporary legal world, rendering South Africa "a vanguard of
learning about the potentials and challenges of justiciable economic
and social rights".60 In the following, we will examine briefly this South
African model and then try to situate Kong Yunming from a comparative
perspective.
The socio-economic rights provided for in the South African
Constitution includes "the right to have access to adequate housing"61
and the right to have access to "health care services", "sufficient food and
water" and "social security, including, if [people] are unable to support
themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance". 62 It is
expressly provided that "[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of" these rights. 63 These provisions are justiciable in the
sense that the South African Constitutional Court has relied on them
in reviewing governmental measures, and has made orders and provided
remedies in cases where the measures were found wanting.64
For example, in Government of the Republic of South Africa v
Grootboom,65 the court held that the government's housing policy
failed to meet the "reasonableness" standard applied by the court to
determine whether there was a violation of the constitutional right to
housing or of the government's constitutional duty in this regard. In
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign,66 the court, applying
the constitutional provision on the right to health care, required
the government to make antiretroviral drugs more widely available
than under its existing policy. The court's approach to constitutional
adjudication of socio-economic rights has been described as "a model
of reasonableness review",67 or an "administrative law mode 68 of
evaluating whether, given the constitutional provisions on the relevant
socio-economic rights, the government's behaviour under review in the
60 Young (n 35 above), p 19.
61 Article 26.
6 Article 27. Children's rights and the right to education are provided for in Arts 28 and 29
respectively. Article 36 provides for limitations of rights, and Art 39 provides for the
interpretation of the constitutional bill of rights.
6 Articles 26(2) and 27(2).
6 See generally Davis (n 59 above), 521-525; Sandra Liebenberg, "South Africa", in Langford
(n 36 above), Chapter 4; Mark Kende, "Three stages of socio-economic rights?", available at http://
www.iconnectblog.com/2010/01/three-stages-of-socio-economic-rights/ (visited 9 Feb 2014).
65 2001 (1) SA 46.
66 2002 (5) SA 721.
67 Liebenberg (n 64 above), 83, 89.
66 Davis (n 59 above), 522; Dennis M Davis, "Socio-economic rights: The promise and limitation
- The South African experience", in Daphne Barak-Erez and Aeyal M Gross (eds), Exploring
Social Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 193, 207; Liebenberg (n 64 above), 90.
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particular case is reasonable.69 This "reasonableness" standard of review
is often contrasted with the "minimum core content" or "minimum
core obligations" approach,70 which means the court would enunciate a
substantive minimum content of the socio-economic right in question
which the government must give effect to or can only depart from with
sufficient justification.
The difference between the two approaches can be illustrated with
reference to Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg" which concerns the right
to have access to sufficient water. In this case, pre-paid water meters were
installed in a poor township in the suburbs of the City of Johannesburg
the effect of which was that the residents would only be entitled to
25 litres of water per day free of charge and had to pay for any additional
amount of water they used. The "minimum core" approach as advocated
by some scholars" and as adopted by the Columbian constitutional
court73 would require the court to determine the minimum amount
of water which residents are entitled to have per day free of charge.
However, the South African constitutional court declined to rule on this
question,7 4 and instead examined whether the government had taken
69 The South African Constitutional Court has pointed out (in para 41 of its Grootboom judgment)
that the "Court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether pubic money could have been better
spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable".
(This passage was cited in Liebenberg (n 64 above) at 84 and in Davis (59 above) at 522.)
Young points out that this doctrine of reasonableness "uses a form of proportionality reasoning"
(Young (n 35 above), 125); Liebenberg agrees that "reasonableness" review incorporates "a
proportionality analysis" (Liebenberg (n 64 above), 91), and promotes "a culture of justification"
(Liebenberg (n 64 above), 90; Young (n 35 above), 126). "The employment of concepts sourced
in administrative law such as rationality review or review for reasonableness could promote a
culture of justification in the implementation of public policy. ... the judiciary could compel
government to produce evidence to substantiate its claim that policies existed and were being
implemented to ensure the fulfillment of socio-economic rights" (Davis (n 68 above), 207).
0 See generally Young (n 35 above), 66-87; Liebenberg (n 64 above), 83.
71 2010 (4) SA 1.
72 There has been some scholarly criticism of the unwillingness of the South African Constitutional
Court to adopt the "minimum core" approach to socio-economic rights: see Davis (n 59 above),
522-523; Liebenberg (n 64 above), 90.
7 Adopting the "minimum core" approach, the Columbian Constitutional Court has held in a
2011 case that "the core of the fundamental right to water entitles each person to receive a
daily amount of 50 liters": Carlos Bernal, "In search of alternative standards for the adjudication
of socioeconomic rights", available at http://www.iconnectblog.com/2012/10/in-search-of-
alternative-standards-for-the-adjudication-of-socioeconomic-rights/ (visited 9 Feb 2014). For
the Columbian practice, see also DM Davis, "Socio-economic rights", in Michel Rosenfeld
and Andras Saj6 (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012) 1020, 1030-32 (describing the Columbian approach as a "strong right/
strong remedy approach"); Langford (ed) (n 36 above), 22; Young (n 35 above), 84.
7 This was despite the fact that the two courts below it - the High Court and the Supreme
Court of Appeal - had both held that the daily supply of 25 litres of water free of charge was
inadequate, ruling that the constitutional provision should be interpreted to require a daily
supply of 50 litres and 42 litres respectively as a minimum level of entitlement: see Young (n 35
above), 85; Davis (n 59 above), 524.
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reasonable measures in the circumstances to enable residents to enjoy
the right to water."
The South African experience demonstrates that in any constitutional
system of justiciable socio-economic rights, at least two major issues need
to be addressed. The first is how to give meaning and substance to - or
how to "concretise" - abstractly formulated rights such as the right to
housing, right to health care or right to social security.76 This problem is
particularly relevant to socio-economic rights, because they are "positive"
rights, the realisation of which requires positive actions to be taken by the
government and financial resources to be devoted to them. These rights
may be contrasted with "negative" rights such as the right to freedom of
expression or freedom of assembly, which only require the state to abstain
from actions that interfere with such rights. The exercise of concretising
"positive" rights is a very different one from that of demarcating the
boundaries of "negative" rights.
Second, the question also arises as to what standard the court
should apply in evaluating whether the government has failed to act
in accordance with the constitutional provisions on socio-economic
rights. This second issue is to some extent related to the first issue.
For example, if the "minimum core" approach is adopted in response to
the first issue, then the court may hold that the constitution has been
violated where citizens are not able to enjoy the minimum core of a
particular socio-economic right as defined by the court, or require the
government to provide sufficient justification for its failure to provide
such minimum core in order to avoid the court's finding that there is
a violation of the constitution. However, the approach of the South
African constitutional court suggests that even if one does not adopt
The Constitutional Court said at para 61 of its judgment: "It is institutionally inappropriate
for a court to determine precisely what the achievement of any particular social and economic
right entails and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of the
right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the institutions of
government best placed to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets and to
determine what targets are achievable in relation to social and economic rights". (This passage
was cited in Davis (n 59 above), 524.)
6 It has been pointed out that "the perception of lack of content, and of nonjusticiability, ... have
been described as two parts of a negative feedback mechanism that sidelines economic and
social rights in international human rights law": Young (n 35 above), 78 (emphasis supplied).
Similarly, in domestic law, "the enforcement of social and economic rights was particularly
problematic because of a manifest judicial incapacity to enforce social and economic rights,
arising particularly, from the indeterminacy of these legal guarantees": Davis (n 59 above), 521
(emphasis supplied).
" It has been pointed out that "the minimum core" is "a concept which mediates the necessary
'limitations' on rights by requiring a particular level of justification if the minimum of the
right is not satisfied, which the state, rather than the claimant, must prove": Young (n 35
above), 81.
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the "minimum core" approach, it is possible to enforce constitutional
provisions on socio-economic rights, and that is to do so by reviewing
the government's behaviour, actions (including omissions) and policies
on the basis of the standard of "reasonableness".
How then should we understand or characterise the CFAs approach
to the interpretation and enforcement of the social welfare right that
BL36 provides for? I would suggest that its approach actually incorporates,
though probably without the CFA judges being consciously and
deliberately doing so, both the "minimum core content" approach and
the "reasonableness" approach in the adjudication of constitutionally
enshrined socio-economic rights discussed above. Ruling that BL36
provides constitutional protection for social welfare rights at their 1997
level gives BL36 a minimum core content, and overcomes the problem
of the uncertainty of the content of constitutionally declared socio-
economic rights which makes them difficult to enforce judicially. And
holding that adjustments of the 1997 level of these social welfare rights
(ie changes to the relevant rules and policies that prevailed in 1997)
are constitutionally permissible provided that they can be justified
by proportionality analysis (in which the ultimate test is whether the
adjustment is manifestly unreasonable or without any reasonable
foundation) enables the court to adjudicate on the reasonableness of
the adjustment, and is to this extent similar to the "reasonableness"
review conducted in South Africa. Furthermore, setting the baseline for
constitutionally protected social welfare rights at their 1997 level and
requiring the government to provide justification for any retreat from it
is consistent with the following views of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights:
"There is a strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in
relation to the right to social security are prohibited under the Covenant.
If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has
the burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most
careful consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified
by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant,
in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources
of the State party. The Committee will look carefully at whether:
(a) there was reasonable justification for the action; (b) alternatives were
comprehensively examined; (c) there was genuine participation of affected
groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives; (d) the
measures were directly or indirectly discriminatory; (e) the measures will
have a sustained impact on the realization of the right to social security,
an unreasonable impact on acquired social security rights or whether an
individual or group is deprived of access to the minimum essential level
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of social security and (f) whether there was an independent review of the
measures at the national level".
As mentioned above, the framers of the Basic Law in enacting BL36
might not have intended to protect any particular social welfare right
that existed at the time of the 1997 handover against any subsequent
change in the relevant rules or policies, particularly where the change
is not retroactive. And in enacting BL145, their intention might have
been only to forbid any change that is so substantial as to amount to "the
abandonment of the previous system"." The "stroke of genius" in the
CFA's decision in Kong Yunming is to celebrate a happy marriage between
BL36 and BL145 so as to give a "minimum core content" to BL36 and
thus render it justiciable. Such justiciability of social welfare rights in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is perhaps an unintended
consequence of the enactment of the Basic Law.
* General Comment No. 19, "The right to social security (Art 9)", U.N. Doc. E/C.12/
GC/19(2008), para 42. This passage was cited and discussed in Karen Kong, "Right to Social
Welfare" in Johannes Chan and CL Lim (eds), Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (Hong Kong:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 787, 801 and 798. The Committee had made a similar point regarding
"deliberately retrogressive measures" more briefly earlier in its General Comment No. 3, U.N.
Doc. E/i 1991/23, annex III (1990), para 9. This para 9 was cited in Kong Yunming by Stock
VP in the Court of Appeal, [80] and by Bokhary NPJ in the CFA, [179]. In South Africa,
the Committee's view that "retrogressive measures" requires particularly strong justification has
been endorsed by the Constitutional Court, and is said to "[create] the basis for challenging
cutbacks in social programmes": Liebenberg (n 64 above), 84. In Hungary, the Constitutional
Court has been "willing to strike down cuts in social insurance benefits": Langford (ed)
(n 36 above), 23.
'9 See n 29 above and the accompanying text.
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